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Abstract
The Mind-Body Problem, which constitutes the starting point for a large part of
the speculations about consciousness and conscious experience, can be re-stated in
an equivalent way, using the ‘brain duplication’ argument described in this paper.
If we assume that consciousness follows from a peculiar organization of physical
matter and energy, namely that it does not transcend physical reality, then the
brain duplication argument gives a possible interesting physical characterization of
the mind: namely, a sort of extensive interdependence of the brain with the whole
surrounding physical world in giving rise to consciousness.
Key words: mind/body problem, mind, consciousness, physical world
PACS: 01.55.+b
1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental problem in dealing with conscious experiences
and consciousness is the following: if I am able to completely describe the
physical state of my brain (conceding that all the physics necessary to such
description is already known), may I safely say to have completely described
my mental state, my subjective experience too? The point is that my subjec-
tive experiences, like for example those of pain, joy or smell (generally referred
to as qualia), seem not to get exhausted in a physical-functional description
of my cerebral states, even in the most complete description we are able to
imagine to. Actually, the description of the physical processes which take place
in my brain, when I experience pain for example, seems not to be a complete
description of my subjective experience of pain; at most, it seems to be only
⋆ Dedicated to the memory of my grandfather Giulio-Fiore.
Preprint submitted to Philosophy Now First draft: August 2003
a complete description of the cerebral states of my brain during my pain ex-
perience.
In other words, it seems that a barrier, impassable to every physical theory,
forbids any complete objective description of subjective experience, or, at least,
every complete objective description of a subjective experience simply does
not include the subjective experience itself. The objective description and the
subjective experience seem to belong to different and ‘orthogonal’ dimensions,
the outside and the inside.
What I have described above briefly summarizes the well-known Mind-Body
Problem, the main ingredient of the philosophical investigations of the mind
and a thorn in the side of physicalism, namely of those who believe in a
complete reduction of consciousness to peculiar physical processes of the brain
(for accessible and exhaustive reviews of the Mind-Body Problem see, for
example, Nagel [1] and Chalmers [2]).
In this paper I provide an equivalent formulation of the Mind–Body Problem,
which I will call the ‘brain duplication’ argument, and I will show that if we
assume that consciousness is in any case a physical process which takes place
in the physical world, in the most general sense of these terms, namely that
it does not transcend physical reality, then the human brain, in giving rise to
the mind, might be characterized by the astonishing property of an extensive
interdependence with the whole surrounding physical world.
2 The ‘brain duplication’ argument
For the sake of thought experiment, let us suppose that we manage to create
an exact, physically identical duplicate of my brain, as it is in this precise
moment. Actually, it does not matter whether we do not known operatively
how to do it. The point is that since at least a brain exists physically, then
nothing forbids us to imagine an identical physical duplicate of it, as well as
nothing forbids us to imagine an identical physical duplicate, atom by atom,
of the sheet of paper on which these words are written, just for the fact that
such sheet of paper exists, even if probably we will never be able to do the
actual duplicate.
Now, just after the creation of this duplicate, how would my own conscious-
ness react? As everyone of you can experience directly, one of the leading
characteristics of consciousness is the perception of its own uniqueness, the
uniqueness of oneself and of its own conscious experience, and, in addition,
the perception of the persistence of such uniqueness (I feel to be myself also
in different periods and different places). Therefore, if I were able to exactly
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duplicate my brain, would my own consciousness change? And if it changes,
how does it change? Would I feel to be here, where I was before the duplica-
tion, but at the same time would I feel to be there, where my brain duplicate
is now?
I believe that the most natural answer for everyone is that I will continue
to be myself as I was before the duplication. But then, who or what is my
exact physical duplicate? If the two brains are physically identical and their
consciousnesses are different, in what do they differ? Here two possible ap-
proaches to the problem are presented.
3 Non-physical explanation
Consciousness is not physically reproducible in the reality. Namely it does
not depend on physical reality and it is in some sense ‘outside’ it: thus, dis-
tinct conscious experiences and consciousnesses may even be attached to two
physically identical brains, or only one of these brains may be conscious (and
the other one may not; the duplicate brain, for example, might be a so-called
zombie). If it is so, there is not much to do; as a matter of fact, consciousness
would constitute a prime and alien property, to be added to the rest of the
physical properties of the brain.
However, such hypothesis seems to be scientifically frustrating and, after all,
not particularly reasonable. I guess that not many researchers would honestly
feel up to deny any link between consciousness and the physical world (even if
such link is not completely clear from a scientific point of view). Even if we as-
sume that the existence of the brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the presence of consciousness, the latter must necessarily have a physical
interaction with the brain, otherwise it would not even make sense to talk
about brain as necessary condition, without speaking about the substantial
amount of data achieved nowadays in the neurosciences on the neural corre-
lates of consciousness. Moreover, matter can act on mind and consciousness, as
any physical and chemical interferences on our state of consciousness can eas-
ily demonstrate. So, matter, mind and consciousness have to speak the same
‘language’. And therefore consciousness must be a physically characterizable,
a physically tractable entity.
Such physical entity might be completely internal or external (partially or
totally) to the brain. In the first case we just would have that the exact
physical reproduction of one’s brain would give tout court the consciousness of
that person (and hence, the brain duplication dilemma). If, on the contrary,
this entity were external, it might be one and unique, or there might be many,
one of them corresponding to each consciousness currently existing in the
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Fig. 1. A na¨ıve sketch of the argument described in the text.
world. Yet, this further distinction is not important in our case: plausibly, two
physically identical brains would always interact in the same way with the
same external physical agent (like two equally tuned radio receivers ‘interact’
always with the same radio station, although there are a lot of different radio
frequencies in the air), and again the brain duplication dilemma would be left
untouched. However, I believe that now this dilemma is ready to be tackled
with the possible physical explanation described in the next section.
4 A possible physical explanation
Let us suppose instead that consciousness depends on physical reality, namely
on the peculiar organization of physical matter and energy, in the most general
sense of these terms, and also let us do not exclude the possibility, suggested
in the previous section, that consciousness originates not only in the physics of
the brain but also through the interaction with an external physical process.
A possible explanation of the seemingly paradoxical picture originated in the
brain duplication argument is that (the evolution of) the cerebral processes
involved in the rise of consciousness might physically depend not only on the
physics of the brain itself but actually also on all the things which physically
surround such brain, in the sense that it depends on the organization of all
the surrounding physical matter and energy.
In such framework, the physically exact copy of my brain, which is in the
region of the space B(x
c
, y
c
, z
c
), interacts with all the surrounding physical
world, and thus also with my original brain which is in the region of space
B(x
o
, y
o
, z
o
). Similarly, my own original brain, which is in the region of space
B(x
o
, y
o
, z
o
), interacts with all the surrounding physical world, and thus also
with the physically exact copy of my brain, which is in B(x
c
, y
c
, z
c
). Therefore,
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it is clear (see fig. 1) that the boundary conditions for the two identical brains
are not identical, and the evolution of cerebral states, as well as consciousness,
might not be identical (although the memory of all the past experiences might
be the same in every details for both brains). A similar conclusion on the
possibility of an extensive physical interdependence of the human brain with
the whole surrounding physical world in giving rise to mind has been drawn in
another thought experiment (D’Abramo [3]) but through a different approach
involving the notion of algorithmic complexity.
Note that any finite version of this approach, i.e. that the suggested physical
dependence is only on a finite portion of the surrounding physical world, does
not change much the point. As a matter of fact, the brain+‘finite portion of
physical world’ must be a physically isolated system, i.e. a totally isolated
system. For if it were not, two such systems within two different environments
would eventually lead to the same dilemma on consciousness as before, since
the same consciousness will eventually experience different environments at
the same time. Hence, even in any finite approach, the finite portion of the
surrounding physical world is in fact all the surrounding physical world. Now,
whether there are spatial limits to be understood in the word “all ” used before,
and whether they are posed by the concept of visible universe and finite speed
of light, the discussion of this is beyond the scope of the present note.
Thus, the brain might be far from being a semi-closed box, opened only to the
five senses, and the common perception that our brain does not continuously
interact at a deeper physical level with the rest of the physical world might be
simply wrong. As a loose analogy, if the physical reality were the water of a
sea, our brain would not be like a submarine guided by sonar, rather it would
be more like a soaked sponge.
So far, we have never made mention to how consciousness rises, or to which
are the specific physical ‘mechanisms’ at the basis of consciousness, but this
was not the topic of our paper, other than being a very complicated and long-
standing issue (irresolvable at the moment, I think). Rather, I have proposed a
possible physical characterization of consciousness and mind: the uniqueness
of conscious experience and consciousness might depend also on the whole
surrounding physical world, in the sense of the organization of its physical
matter and energy. But, if this were the case, it would be very strange if
the rise itself of consciousness and mind did not depend on the extensive
interaction of the brain with whole surrounding physical world.
By the way, if we do not accept the picture of the extensive physical interaction
between brain and the whole surrounding physical world, but want to maintain
the dependence of mind and consciousness on physical reality, and thus that
mind and consciousness completely arise from the physical organization of
the brain alone, all this would inevitably result in another type of ‘extensive
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interdependence’, a sort of non-locality: as a matter of fact, after the brain
duplication, the very same mind (the very same person) could be in two very
distant places at the same time.
I believe that talking about the necessary physical mechanisms responsible for
the suggested extensive interaction, and actually talking about the detailed
physical dynamics and evolution of such interaction, is premature at the mo-
ment. It might be said (and it was actually said already) that the human
brain may be assimilated to a complex dynamical system, extremely sensitive
to all the surrounding physical conditions (in such case we should mention
the so-called deterministic chaos; see for example Newman [4]), or that quan-
tum mechanics may be deeply involved (many people have proposed various
quantum mechanisms to explain consciousness, so to compile a complete list
of references on this topic is hopeless; see for example Bohm [5] and references
therein), or, most probably, that a new kind of physics is needed. However,
although such aspect of the problem is obviously essential in the study of the
origin of consciousness, it is secondary in the present context.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Alessandro Silvestrini for having brought to my attention the
‘brain duplication’ argument, during a conversation around a coffee table. By
the way, the name of the Cafe` was ‘Miro´’, thus for the sake of joke, I suggest
to call the argument of this paper ‘the Miro´ hypothesis’. I am also grateful
to William A. Adams for insightful comments on this paper. I wish to thank
Herbert F. Muller for having posted a previous version of this paper on the
Karl Jaspers Forum Website.
References
[1] Nagel, T., 1987. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to
Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
[2] Chalmers, D.J., (December 1995). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific
American, pp. 62–68.
[3] D’Abramo, G., 2005. Some non-conventional ideas about algorithmic complexity,
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 25/1, pp. 29–32.
Preprint archive http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0211222
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2004.11.040
[4] Newman, D.V., 1997. Chaos, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem.
Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 180–196.
6
[5] Bohm, D., 1990. A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter.
Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 271–286.
7
